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REVIEW ESSAY 

LAW, SPORTS, AND POPULAR CULTURE: 





RICHARD P. COLE* 
REVIEW OF PAUL WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: How 
THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BEITER FOR FANS (2000) 
INTRODUCTION 
Professional sports have become central artifacts of American 
popular culture. In American popular culture, sports are some­
times even associated with religion.1 Paradoxically, in spite of the 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 1 wish to 
thank Dean Arthur Gaudio, Professor James Gordon, Western New England Law Re­
view staff members Paul Leoni and Crescent Moran for the help they gave me in writ­
ing and completing this review essay. I also wish to thank Professor Bruce Miller for 
reading a draft of the essay. 
1. An example of this association with religion is the statement made by Susan 
Sarandon's character in the film Bull Durham: "I believe in the church of Baseball!" 
PAUL WEILER, LEVELING TIiE PLAYfNG FIELD: How TIiE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS 
BETTER FOR FANs 170 (2000). Weiler believes that 
sports fans have traditionally viewed their favorite sports as a crucial part of 
the American culture, more akin to religion than to business. A game like 
baseball is felt to be much more a part of American heritage than the fine arts, 
and who wins the Super Bowl [is] far more important than who wins the 
Oscars. 
[d. at 104. 

Weiler also cites Justice Blackmun's opinion in Curt Flood's classic attack upon base­

ball's reserve clause: "Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred 

years and enjoys a unique place in our American heritage." [d. at 170 (quoting Flood v. 

Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 266 (1972)). Rather than focusing upon "commercial and profit 





The importance of sports in American popular culture was again demonstrated by 
the reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Many stated that sports 
appeared trivial after these events. True enough. Nevertheless, a large amount of time 
was devoted to discussing and deciding whether or not to postpone upcoming sports 
events. 
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stature professional sports enjoy in American culture and their 
enormous rise in popularity in recent decades, sports fans have be­
come increasingly alienated. This alienation stems from a number 
of sources: labor disputes;2 free agency, and the seemingly endless 
movement of players; rich players, who sometimes engage in un­
popular behavior; and owners who request public financing of ex­
pensive new stadiums while threatening to move their franchises. 3 
From the perspective of popular culture, most of the maladies 
of contemporary professional sports can be traced to two much­
maligned foundations of modern American life. The first is the in­
creasing commercialization of sports, as represented by the billions 
of dollars made annually by owners of sports franchises, players, 
their agents, and various marketers of sports property.4 The sec­
ond, which is the particular concern of this essay, is the interweav­
ing of various strands of law into the everyday fabric of sports. 
These strands of law include the private lawmaking by sports 
leagues and their commissioners, and, increasingly, the decisions of 
arbitration tribunals, provided for by the collective bargaining 
agreements between players and team owners. More and more, 
however, legal issues related to sports are being taken to courts or 
legislatures for resolution. In whatever forum law is applied to 
sports, lawyers are almost always involved.5 Perhaps this is why 
three of the four commissioners of major professional leagues in 
America are lawyers.6 However, it is not the lawyer-executive, but 
the hardened lawyer-agent negotiating a huge contract for his pro­
fessional athlete-client, who epitomizes the sordid intrusion of com­
mercial greed and law into sports.:] 
2. Id. at 103. During the 1990's, each of the major sports leagues was "rocked by 
a big labor dispute ... resulting in a stoppage of play, a lawsuit, or a combination of the 
two, and we are quite sure there will be numerous replays in the coming decade." Id. 
3. See discussion infra Parts I, II, III. 
4. Sprinkled throughout the book are statistics on the amazing rise in revenues 
and salaries of the major professional sports leagues and their players during the past 
generation. Weiler observes that fans feel quite upset by "money battles" and their 
impact upon the playing of professional sports. This animosity is in contrast to the 
feelings of moviegoers, who rarely question the unprecedented receipts of popular mov­
ies. Id. at 103. 
5. Weiler observes that American fans rarely open the sports section of the news­
paper or turn on the sports news without reading or hearing about a lawsuit. Sports is 
one of the two industries that are most inundated with lawyers and lawsuits; the other is 
entertainment. [d. at 1. 
6. They are Paul Tagliabue of the National Football League, David Stern of the 
National Basketball Association, and Gary Bettman of the National Hockey League. 
7. Weiler observes that Americans have "a love-hate relationship with lawyers," 
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In popular culture, the infiltration of law into the interstices of 
sports seems ironic from several perspectives. One, of course, is 
popular culture's association of sports with religion. The other is 
the view of sports as a last frontier in contemporary society for gar­
gantuan heroes, who operate above the constraints that civilization 
imposes upon the lives of ordinary people. 
The most fundamental theme of Leveling the Playing Field: 
How the Law Can Make Sports Better for Fans, is that, as much as 
popular culture may disdain law, legal regulation of many facets of 
the sports industry is unavoidably necessary if it is to remain a vi­
brantly growing enterprise pleasing to fans. Indeed, the book itself 
represents the intrusion of another lawyer into the domain of 
sports. Unlike the sordid sports lawyer in popular culture, the 
stance of Harvard Law School Professor Paul Weiler in this book is 
similar to that of the disinterested political leader envisioned by 
James Madison in No. 10 of The Federalist Papers.s That is, he tries 
to stand above, and thoughtfully and impartially arbitrate, the con­
flicting interests of the various constituencies of the modern sports 
industry. Weiler's proposals are invariably supported by a concise 
synthesis of a wealth of empirical data. This data includes wonder­
ful overviews of historical developments in professional sports since 
their origin, which, in the case of baseball, dates back to the late 
nineteenth century.9 One who reads Leveling the Playing Field, 
then, is rewarded with exposure to both a remarkable array of in­
formation about professional sports, as well as thought-provoking 
proposals for its reform. 
Leveling the Playing Field is the product of twenty years of 
thinking about the problems in sports by an eminent authority on 
sports law. Part I of this review looks at the relationship between 
professional athletes and fans. Part II examines the relationship be­
tween team owners and their players. Part III considers the rela­
tionships among owners, and also between owners and fans of their 
respective teams. Each of these sets of relationships has engen­
dered friction during the past generation. The purpose of the pre­
sent essay is to acquaint the reader with Weiler's major proposals 
for making sports better for fans and to suggest that the scorned 
as "Sir Galahads who fight for justice, but also as deceitful schemers."· WEILER, supra 
note 1, at 1-2. 
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
9. WEILER, supra note 1, at 120-23 (concerning the history of baseball). 
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relationship between law and sports seems to have become a per­
manent marriage. 
I. PLAYERS AND FANS: THE MORAL 

REGULATION OF ATHLETES 

Major professional sports leagues-baseball, football, basket­
ball, and hockey-all have commissioners. They are vested with 
the authority to act in the best interest of their leagues. In exercis­
ing this authority, they mete out discipline to players whom they 
believe to have engaged in conduct harmful to their sports.10 As we 
enter the new millennium, evidence exists indicating that the scope 
of discipline exercised by the commissioners of professional leagues 
over players is expanding.ll As an enterprise, professional sports 
leagues are unique in possessing such regulatory authority over 
their employees. Since professional sports are a form of entertain­
ment, it is notable that the artistic entertainment industry has no 
comparable authority. Thus, an important question to consider is: 
What rationales might justify vesting the commissioners of profes­
sional sports leagues with such disciplinary authority over their em­
ployees? There are two recurring rationales offered to distinguish 
professional athletes from entertainers and to justify the discipline 
applied to athletes: the integrity of competition rationale and the 
role model rationale. 
The integrity of competition rationale begins with the premise 
that "the true essence of sports is athletic competition, a fierce 
struggle by players and teams pushing each other to new heights. "12 
But there is a paradox. For the fierce competition of professional 
sports to create an entertaining product, the teams in a sports 
league must engage in a cooperative venture. As a joint venture, 
everyone involved in professional sports has a stake in the integrity 
of the competitors. To assure the integrity of competition, in turn, 
requires that the leagues have a disciplinary authority over all play­
ers. Yet another reason for disciplining players, related to the in­
tegrity of competition rationale, is to present to the public a safe 
10. See id. at 9-15. 
11. Evidence of this expansion is shown in how Major League Baseball defines 
the power of its commissioner to act in its best interest: "[N]othing in this Section 4 
shall limit the Commissioner's authority to act on any matter that involves the integrity 
of, or public confidence in, the national game of Baseball." PAUL WEILER & GARY 
ROBERTS, STATUTORY AND DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT TO SPORTS AND THE LAW 32 
(2d ed. 1998). 
12. WEILER, supra note 1, at 2. 
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and orderly athletic contest.13 
A second basis for the disciplinary authority of league commis­
sioners is related to a major distinction between professional ath­
letes and artistic entertainers. Unlike the artist, the athlete is 
supposed to act as a role model for the public.14 The connecting 
link between these two rationales for discipline is to assure that ath­
letic contests are "challenging to players and attractive to 
spectators. "15 
Examples of the exercise of discipline upon athletes based 
upon each of these rationales abound. Perhaps the quintessential 
example of discipline to preserve fair competition is the limitations 
upon the use of performance-enhancing drugs by athletes. Athletes 
who consume these drugs gain an unfair advantage over competi­
tors. Nevertheless, to allow players room to enhance their abilities 
and performances, some allegedly performance-enhancing sub­
stances remain unregulated by some, or· all, professional sports 
leagues.16 
Another example of the influence of the fair competition ratio­
nale is the resistance of the Professional Golfers Association (here­
inafter PGA) to the petition of Casey Martin for the right to ride a 
golf cart while he competes in PGA eventsY Martin has a degen­
erative circulatory disorder that makes it painful and difficult to 
walk.18 Nevertheless, the PGA has maintained that to allow Martin 
to ride a cart would confer upon him an unfair advantage over his 
competitors, who suffer fatigue over time from walking and, there­
fore, become less effective golfers.19 
Further, to assure a reasonably safe and orderly athletic con­
13. See id. 
14. See generally id. at 73-103 (discussing how athletes are viewed as role 
models). 
15. Id. at 2. 
16. For example, as yet, no league bans the use of creatine, an amino acid that 
purports to build muscle power. The National Football League prohibits its players 
from using andro, a testosterone-producing substance; however, Major League Baseball 
is waiting for further testing before deciding whether or not to regulate its use. Id. at 
74, 76. It remains unclear how different sports leagues draw the boundary line between 
legal and illegal substances that enhance athletic performance. 
17. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). 
18. Id. at 1885. 
19. Id. at 1886; see also WEILER, supra note 1, at 27-30. Advocates of the walk­
ing-only rule often cite Ken Venturi's victory in the U.S. Open in 1964. On a hot and 
oppressive day, the ill Venturi risked possible death to complete a 36-hole final round of 
that tournament. WEILER, supra note 1, at 29 (noting Arnold Palmer's comment that 
the "'walking rule' was essential to 'inject the element of fatigue into the skill of shot­
making"'). 
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test, professional sports leagues punish what are considered to be 
excessive acts of violence within the context of their sports. Exam­
ples of these include bean ball battles in baseball, flagrant fouls in 
basketball, prohibited uses of the hockey stick, and fighting among 
players and with fans.20 
The most important, and controversial, basis for disciplining 
players in contemporary professional sports is the role model ratio­
nale.21 For example, when professional leagues discipline athletes 
who use recreational drugs, they appear to be punishing those ath­
letes for failing to be good role models. Unlike performance-en­
hancing drugs, the use of recreational drugs over time normally 
erodes a player's physical skills.22 The influence of the role model 
rationale can also be seen in the disciplining of athletes who engage 
in violent acts outside of athletic contests, such as the physical 
abuse of women.23 Since the abuse of women does not affect the 
fairness of an athletic contest, leagues that punish athletes for com­
mitting such acts must be basing their discipline upon a role model 
rationale.24 
Finally, there are examples of the use of discipline that can 
claim justification in both the integrity of competition and role 
model rationales. Punishment of athletes who agree to throw 
games for pay from gamblers is one such example.25 Morally repre­
hensible athletes commit this action, making a sham of the competi­
tive contest. A bright side of the commercialization of modern 
sports is that players are now so well paid that they are unlikely to 
conspire with gamblers to throw games or shave points.26 Never­
theless, allegations continue to surface that some professional ath­
letes gamble. If players bet on their own games, the integrity of 
competition may be undermined, since they may provide gamblers 
with inside knowledge about their teams.27 Discipline of athletes 
who gamble on competition outside of their own sports, however, 
20. WEILER, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
21. Id. at 87-89. During the 1977 National Basketball Association finals, a fight 
broke out between players of the Philadelphia 76ers and the Portland Trailblazers. One 
player, Julius Erving, walked to another section of the court and sat quietly until the 
referees restored order-an outstanding example of a sports figure acting as a good role 
model. 
22. Id. at 95-96. 
23. [d. at 90-95. 
24. See id. at 94-95 (discussing the National Football League commissioner's 
change in attitude in 1998 toward players' misconduct off the field). 
25. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 31-55, for a discussion of sports gambling. 
26. [d. at 51. 
27. [d. at 54. 
437 2002] LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 
can only be justified from the perspective of the role model 
rationale.28 
Disciplining professional athletes to assure fair competItIOn 
seems to be a self-evident proposition. The perception of athletes 
as role models, however, is not. Some professional athletes, such as 
outspoken retired basketball star Charles Barkley, have rebelled at 
being cast as role models at all.29 In contrast, the public expects 
today's sports figures to act as role models. Can this expectation 
for professional athletes, but not artistic entertainers, be justified? 
Weiler thinks so. He argues that while the public may identify with 
the roles actors play, they identify directly with sports stars as "real 
people."30 This is especially true for children. The famous athlete 
who takes drugs is more likely to lead children off the straight and 
narrow path than the artistic entertainer.31 While this distinction 
places a special burden upon athletes, it creates a payoff for them. 
Athletes, not actors, usually receive lucrative advertising con­
tracts.32 Further, the unique joint venture characteristic of profes­
sional sports also requires that players act as role models.33 
Professional sports benefit from every player having a clean im­
age.34 Finally, viewing the professional athlete as a role model 
seems once again to suggest the association of sports and religion in 
the popular American mind.35 
If Weiler persuasively argues for the professional athlete as a 
unique role model in American culture, important questions re­
main concerning the permissible scope of law in the punishment of 
fallen athletes. These issues can be identified if we reconsider the 
athlete's proclivity to engage in acts of violence. When violent acts 
occur on the playing field, athletes are clearly subject to league dis­
cipline.36 Conversely, when athletes engage in acts of violence 
28. See id. at 53-54 (suggesting that the real problem with athletes gambling lies 
in the criminal element associated with illegal gambling). 
29. "In a Nike ad [Barkley stated:] 'I'm not a role model. I am paid to wreak 
havoc on the basketball court, not to raise someone else's kids.'" Id. at 89. 
30. Id. 
31. See id. (discussing the differences between sports figures and actors). 
32. See id. 
33. Id. at 90. 
34. Id. at 87-90. 
35. Churches sometimes discipline clergy who violate their rules. See, e.g., LEF­
FERTS A. LOETSCHER, THE BROADENING CHURCH: A STUDY OF THEOLOGICAL ISSUES 
OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH SINCE 1869, at 48-62 (1954) (relating the case of Pro­
fessor Charles A. Briggs, a Presbyterian theologian who was prosecuted for heresy by 
his own church for challenging Presbyterian ideologies). 
36. WEILER, supra note 1, at 9-16. 
438 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:431 
outside of the field of play, as with violence against women, state 
law clearly applies. Should a professional league discipline one of 
its athletes for such acts? How far should league discipline extend 
for morally questionable activities having no impact upon athletes' 
on-field performance? 
The issue of disciplining professional athletes could be the ba­
sis for an entire law review article. A libertarian would argue, 
based upon expansive notions of individual liberty and privacy 
rights, that off-field activities of athletes should be left solely to 
state law to resolve. Weiler does not address this position, presum­
ably because it necessarily circumscribes his view of sports figures 
as special role models in American society. To illustrate Weiler's 
position on the thorny issue of the scope of the discipline that pro­
fessional sports exercises over its players, it is helpful to compare 
and contrast his views concerning the use of recreational drugs by 
athletes, which professional leagues have routinely punished, with 
off-field acts of violence, which professional leagues have largely 
ignored.37 Weiler distinguishes these two cases in the following 
way. He believes that sports leagues should punish players who 
commit acts of violence against women at least to the extent they 
punish those who consume recreational drugs.38 To Weiler, the crit­
ical distinction between these two cases is that athletes who use rec­
reational drugs typically inflict harm only upon themselves, while 
those who commit violent acts harm others.39 Thus, Weiler views 
violence upon women as a greater threat to American society than 
the use of recreational drugs and, therefore, favors league discipline 
of such players whether or not they are prosecuted for a crime by 
the state.4Q 
Another difficult question is how severely professional leagues 
should discipline athletes for making offensive statements in inter­
views or for objectionable artistic expression. Such cases present 
league commissioners with hard choices, such as whether to uphold 
free speech or to try to protect the public image of the league. Wei­
ler recognizes that a "principled" exercise of disciplinary powers 
relative to the off-field activities of professional athletes is very dif­
37. Id. at 92. 
38. Id. at 90-95. 
39. Id. at 94. 
40. Id. at 92 ("From any fair-minded perspective, athletes' assaults on women are 
a far greater source of personal and social harm than their use of cocaine, let alone 
marijuana. "). 
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ficult and requires restraint.41 He believes that, so far, the combina­
tion of collective bargaining, the availability of arbitration, and the 
good sense of the current commissioners of the professional sports 
leagues, has generally resulted in reasoned exercises of discipline of 
players who fail to act as good role models.42 Will this continue to 
be the case in the future with different professional league commis­
sioners? It is unlikely, unless some guidelines for such cases are 
established.43 
One final issue of the appropriate spheres of league discipline 
and state law needs to be addressed. Should state law ever circum­
scribe the exercise of discipline by leagues, sports federations, or 
teams, upon their players? A salient example of such an issue is the 
controversy engendered by the request of Casey Martin, because of 
his severe physical disability, to be allowed to ride a golf cart while 
playing in PGA tournaments.44 Recall that the PGA had resisted 
Martin's request, based upon the view that golf is a game of stamina 
and that riding a cart would confer a competitive advantage upon 
him.45 Martin claimed that to prohibit him from competing because 
he must ride a cart would violate his civil rights under the Ameri­
cans with Disabilities ACt.46 Though Weiler recognizes that the 
PGA's position has validity in some circumstances, he ultimately 
sides with Martin. State law should force the PGA to allow Martin 
to ride a cart.47 Yet, Weiler does not always support state limita­
tions upon league autonomy.48 For example, in light of concerns 
regarding HIV, he generally eschews state interference with a 
league's regulation of players who bleed during an athletic 
41. Id. at 97-98. 
42. See id. at 69-71 (discussing the restrained exercise of broad disciplinary pow­
ers regarding the use of recreational drugs by both National Football League Commis­
sioner Paul Tagliabue and National Basketball Association Commissioner David 
Stern). 
43. One factor that has emerged recently that limits the exercise of league disci­
pline of players is collective bargaining agreements. A number' of them now provide 
mechanisms, like arbitration, for the review and resolution of such cases. See, e.g., id. at 
65-70 (discussing the effect of collective bargaining agreements on the enforcement of 
professional league drug policies). 
44. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). 
45. ld. at 1886-87; see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
46. Id. 
47. WEILER, supra note 1, at 28-30. In fact, the United States Supreme Court, in 
a 7-2 decision, recently upheld Martin's petition to force the PGA to allow him to ride a 
cart. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897. Critical to its decision was the view that walking was 
not fundamental to the game of golf, and that the nature of Martin's infirmity was such 
that he gained no competitive advantage by riding a cart. Id. 
48. WEILER, supra note 1, at 24-27. 
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contest.49 
There are some gaps in Weiler's coverage of player discipline 
issues. For example, it would be helpful to readers if Weiler ex­
plained further why he distinguishes the bleeding professional ath­
lete case from that of Casey Martin. A bigger gap is that, though 
Weiler recognizes that a number of bodies of law regulate contem­
porary sports, the book does not at any point discuss what body, or 
bodies, of law would best regulate the activities of professional ath­
letes (and if it is several bodies of law, exactly how these might 
mesh together). One could build upon this oversight to argue that 
Weiler is a visionary who pays insufficient attention to important 
practical issues. However, a reading of Weiler's generally careful 
analysis of the problems of sports suggests that this would be an 
unfair criticism of his general methodology. Whatever his omis­
sions, Weiler has made his basic point. Clearly, the law plays an 
important role in defining the relationship of professional sports 
figures and their fans. 
II. OWNERS AND PLAYERS: FREE AGENCY 
The watershed event in the history of the relationship of pro­
fessional athletes and club owners was the destruction of the re­
serve clause that limited athletes to playing for one team.50 This 
momentous change, and the rise of free agency, was the result of 
legal advocacy that drew upon contract, labor, and antitrust law.51 
While, in all professional sports, young athletes remain bound to 
one team for a period,52 professional athletes have achieved at last 
a large measure of economic freedom. 
In popular culture free agency is grudgingly accepted, but it is 
also blamed for many of the perceived ills of modern professional 
sports. Free agency unleashed lawyer-agents to extract huge in­
creases in the salaries of star athletes.53 Over the past generation 
the rate of increase in the compensation of the professional athlete 
49. Id. 
50. See id. at 120-25, 135-40, for a discussion of the rise and fall of the reserve 
clause in professional sports. 
51. Id. at 118-69. 
52. In all of the major professional leagues, teams still obtain most of their young 
players by drafting them. Once it drafts players, the team holds the exclusive right to 
their services for a number of years, a period that varies from league to league. Finally, 
after a period of exclusive service for a team, the player attains free agency. See id. at 
205-08, for a discussion of the rookie draft systems in various leagues. 
53. Id. at 103-17. 
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has far outdistanced that of the ordinary American.54 Predictably, 
the players' search for the highest possible paycheck has encoun­
tered the resistance of owners, and engendered labor strife that has 
included strikes and lockouts.55 At the conclusion of these labor­
management confrontations, fans are invariably burdened with in­
creasingly steep prices to attend games and to view them on cable 
television.56 The perception in popular culture, then, is that much 
of what is taking place in professional sports is an unsavory fight 
over money, with the public as its victim.57 
In addition, contemporary players seem to constantly change 
teams. In the view of loyal fans, such movement has undermined 
the "good old times" of stable professional sports teams with favor­
ite players to whom the fans gave undying support,58 Player move­
ment also raises the fear that a competitive imbalance will result in 
an entertainment product that is frustrating or boring for many 
fans.59 This already seems to be coming to fruition in baseball, in 
which small market teams lack any chance of winning a World Se­
ries,60 while the New York Yankees have won three of the last 
fOUr. 61 
Weiler addresses these popular concerns about the effects of 
free agency.62 True, players' salaries have risen dramatically over 
the past generation, but so have both the revenues and values of 
sports franchises.63 Furthermore, free agency has contributed to a 
fairer distribution of revenues between players and owners.64 It has 
not been primarily free agency, but rather ordinary forces of supply 
54. For example, in 1947, the average baseball player earned $11,000 a year, 
about four times the average American worker. Id. at 119. In 1967, the baseball player 
earned $19,000, about three and a half times the income of the average worker. [d. 
Still, in the mid-1970s the average pay of the baseball player was about four times that 
of the average worker. Id. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, 
the relationship between the income of the baseball player and the average worker 
dramatically changed. While the real hourly pay of millions of Americans declined in 
relative value, the average salary of major league baseball players rose to $1.57 million, 
or fifty-six times the income of the average worker. Id. 
55. Id. at 103, 114. 
56. Id. at 104, 172. 
57. Id. at 103-04. 
58. Id. at 175. 
59. Id. at 177-78. 
60. [d. at 182-83. 
61. Id. at 223. 
62. Id. at 170-97. 
63. Id. at 178. 
64. In baseball, for example, the players' share of revenues has risen from under 
20% in 1967 to over 60% in 1999. Id. at 178-79, 198. 
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and demand, that are at the root of higher ticket prices.65 Accord­
ing to Weiler, free agency has not accelerated the rate of movement 
of players from team to team.66 Additionally, some player move­
ment has actually increased the quality of the product presented to 
fans.67 Weiler argues that, in its overall impact, free agency has 
probably contributed to, rather than undermined, the competitive 
balance of professional sports.68 Weiler concludes that everyone in­
volved in professional sports, not just rich players, has greatly bene­
fited from free agency.69 
Weiler's conclusion, however, does not lead him to embrace 
the Major League Baseball Players Association's position that 
sports should adopt an entirely unregulated regime of free market 
bargaining for the relationship of players and owners.70 He pro­
vides a number of reasons for his rejection of that position. First is 
that baseball, which since its 1994 collective bargaining agreement 
failed to impose any meaningful restraint upon players' salaries, 
seems to be evincing some of the competitive imbalance that critics 
65. Id. at 174. The cost of a ticket to the Oscar-winning movie TITANIC remained 
low because the public continued to have many other movie options, with an unlimited 
number of potential showings. Id. 'In contrast, professional sports teams have only a 
finite number of available tickets. Id. For example, ticket prices are especially high in 
Boston because Fenway Park has the smallest seating capacity among baseball stadiums 
in the major leagues. Id. Further, sports leagues create monopolies within their home 
territories. Id.; see id. at 334-40 for a discussion of the monopoly status of sports. 
66.. Id. at 174. Between 1951 and 1976 an average of 4.7 players per team were 
transferred from one club to another each year. Id. at 176. In the eighteen years after 
free agency was established in baseball in 1976, the average player movement declined 
slightly to 4.6 per year. Id. Some of the player movement comes from the increasing 
phenomenon of the geographic relocation of franchises. Id. at 176-77. 
67. Id. at 181. ("As a matter of general market principle, free movement of talent 
from one firm to another is likely to enhance the quality of the overall product offered 
to consumers."). 
68. Id. at 182-83. For example, prior to the mid-1960's, professional baseball was 
dominated primariiy by the New York Yankees and secondarily by the Dodgers and 
Giants. During the next decade smaller market teams became more dominant-the 
Cincinnati Reds, Oakland Athletics, and Baltimore Orioles. Then, during the two de­
cades after free agency became established in 1976, fifteen different baseball teams won 
the World Series. Id. 
69. Id. at 185. 
The clear lesson from baseball experience, then, is that if we must choose be­
tween the traditional reserve system and unrestricted free agency, the latter is 
a far better instrument for improving sports welfare-whether viewed as allo­
cative efficiency in enhancing the quality of the game for fans or distributional 
equality in sharing gains between owners and players. 
Id. 
70. Id. at 186 ("Still, the fact that full free agency makes a sport better than it was 
with no free agency does not necessarily mean that unrestrained free agency is the best 
regime for professional sports."). 
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of free agency fear.n Next, he argues that unlike the artistic en­
tertainment industry, in sports the winner takes the greater share of 
the market,72 For example, a movie studio is generally satisfied 
with having one star in its movie to attract an audience.73 In con­
trast, a sports team with a star has one great incentive to lure other 
stars to the team.74 Even Michael Jordan did not win any champi­
onships without Scottie Pippen. But this "spending frenzy" on the 
part of some teams "tends to send other teams in the opposite di­
rection."75 If an owner knows that he cannot acquire enough talent 
to win a championship, "[t]he rational economic strategy is not sim­
ply to refrain from bidding for free agent players but also to dispose 
of his own best and highest-paid talent."76 Though such "downsiz­
ing" will hurt a team's record on the field, it does not necessarily 
hurt the team's bottom line.77 But the obvious result of such ra­
tional conduct is a less competitive sports product, creating the pro­
fessional sports version of the "tragedy of the commons. "78 
Weiler adds another reason· for distinguishing sports from 
other American businesses in which owners and employees enjoy 
greater freedom to bargain over wages-the "public goods" dimen­
sion to the sports market,79 By this, Weiler seems to refer again to 
the joint venture nature of sportS.80 That is, while professional 
sports teams engage in fierce competition with one another, they 
present a single product whose appeal to the public ultimately rests 
upon the synergistic interaction of all of the teams in a league.81 
Consequently, Weiler stands between those who criticize free 
agency and those who advocate for an unregulated regime of free 
'market bargaining.82 He does not support· any of the salary caps 
that presently exist in professionalsports.83 Nevertheless, for Wei­
71. Id.. The 1960 Pittsburgp Pirates beat a talented Milwaukee Braves team for 
the National League pennant. It then defeated the New York Yankees on a ninth­
inning home run in the seventh game of the World Series. It now seems impossible for 
a team with the Pirates' payroll to win a World Series. 
72. Id. at 186-87. 
73. Id. at 187. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 188. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (discussing the effects of sports "downsizing"). 
78. Id. at 189. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. at 186, 190-97. 
83. Id. at 190. It would be too complicated to recap Weiler's excellent description 
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ler there remain distributional problems with free agency, specifi­
cally with the total amount of money that teams spend on players' 
salaries, and the distribution of salary money among players.84 He 
therefore proposes the adoption of league-wide payroll standards 
that would bring a greater degree of equality both to the players' 
compensation and to the total amount of money that each team in a 
league spends on players' salaries.85 
The most important step that some professional sports leagues 
have taken to encourage a greater equality of spending on salaries 
by teams is revenue sharing.86 Weiler argues, however, that reve­
nue sharing is not effective in achieving this goal.87 Instead, Weiler 
proposes a "meaningfully graduated salary tax" to encourage clubs 
to spend roughly equivalent total amounts on player salaries.88 In 
contrast to baseball's present salary tax, which places a weak tax 
upon the five clubs that have the highest salary payrolls, Weiler's 
approach would have leagues establish a designated total annual 
payroll figure for all of its teams.89 Any team that spent either 
above or below that figure for player salaries would be taxed at an 
agreed rate of taxation.90 
Weiler believes that in contemporary professional sports there 
are also several problems of maldistribution of the wealth among 
professional athletes.91 One is that stars receive much higher sala­
ries than do other players. The other problem is that veteran play­
ers, relative to the value of the contributions they make to their 
teams, receive much more money than do players early in their pro­
of the extant salary cap and salary tax systems in the major professional sports. Weiler 
believes that the term cap is often a misnomer for what is really revenue/salary sharing 
by teams in a league. 
84. See generally id. at 198-219 (discussing the problems with the current salary 
distribution among professional athletes). 
85. Id. at 189 (discussing how a "win-win approach would make the game better 
for fans, and consequently more rewarding for owners and players"). 
86. Id. at 190. 
87. Id. at 196. The Montreal Expos' share of major league baseball revenues for 
television and merchandising was $15 million in 1998. [d. Yet the team's total payroll 
remained just $8 million. Id. In essence, the Expos pocketed some of its own, admit­
tedly low, revenues, as well as some of its shared revenues, giving the team's owners a 
much higher return on their investment than the owners of some clubs who were more 
successful on the field. Id. 
88. Id. at 193-94 (discussing the benefits to sports leagues of a well-designed tax 
system). 
89. Id. at 190-92. 
90. Id. at 193-96. 
91. Id. at 199. 
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fessional careers.92 Incidentally, these high salaries encourage 
teams to cut useful veteran players. This disproportionate pay scale 
is exaggerated by the fact that the careers of professional athletes 
are fragile and often so short that they fail to attain veteran status 
and its salary benefits.93 There are a number of ways the problem 
of under-compensating young athletes could be addressed, includ­
ing the abolition of the player draft.94 Weiler rejects such proposals 
and takes a more moderate approach akin to that established by the 
most recent collective bargaining agreement of the National Bas­
ketball Association in 1998.95 It limits players who become free 
agents after their fourth year to 25% of the team payroll cap figure 
during their fifth and sixth years; 30% from their seventh to ninth 
years; and 35% in their tenth and later years.96 It also includes a 
minimum salary range from slightly under $300,000 in the first year 
to $1,000,000 in the tenth year.97 
Weiler believes that the adoption of proposals such as the Na­
tional Basketball Association's 1998 collective bargaining agree­
ment would help fans by contributing to greater competitive 
balance in sports.98 Such action would, for example, discourage fu­
ture owners from fire sales like the one engaged in by former Flor­
ida Marlins owner Wayne Huizenga after the Marlins won the 
92. Major League Baseball provides a prime example of these problems. Success­
ful collective action by the Major League Baseball Players Association has raised the 
players' share of revenues from under 20% in 1967 to over 60% in 1999. Id. at 198. 
But it has "also dramatically exacerbated the inequality in distribution of their share­
particularly for the new and the journeyman players." Id. The salaries of star players 
are between fifty-five and seventy-five times higher than those of backup players, and 
ten to fifteen times higher than those of other regular players. Id. at 214. The mini­
mum starting salary for a rookie in the major leagues is eight times less than the overall 
average salary, and a much smaller fraction of the pay received by a league veteran. Id. 
at 207. It has been calculated that during their first three years baseball players earn 
about 20% of their market revenue productivity, while players who are eligible for free 
agency earn 135% of theirs. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. at 200. 
95. See generally id. at 198-219. 
96. Id. at 213. 
97. Id. Weiler also likes that the National Basketball Association has agreed to 
pick up much of the additional salary that the veteran makes over the rookie, so that 
teams will make their decisions on which players to retain largely based upon their 
value, not upon their paycheck. Id. But he would like the system to be more gradu­
ated, with, for example, a $50,000 increase in the pay minimum for each year of service. 
Id. at 217. Also, he would like any limits upon the top players' pay to be set on net 
after-tax pay, so that teams in no-tax states do not gain an advantage in obtaining free 
agents. /d. at 213. 
98. Id. at 218-19. 
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World Series in 1997.99 Weiler also argues that the more equitable 
distribution of pay among players is simply fairer when it is based 
upon the contributions that players make to their teams. In this 
regard sports could act as a "role model" for America's broader 
political economy to narrow its massive pay gap,loo 
With professional sports entering a new millennium, are Wei­
ler's proposals for restructuring the relations between players and 
owners persuasive? Certainly a return to the old days of the re­
serve clause is unthinkable-even critics of free agency admit that it 
constituted a form of peonage that violated basic tenets of personal 
libedy,lol It is more difficult to determine whether Weiler's ap­
proach is preferable to unregulated free agency. Critical to'shaping 
one's view concerning Weiler's approach is determining free 
agency's impact on the competitive balance in contemporary 
sports.102 
III. OWNERS AND FANS: THE FINANCING OF NEW STADIUMS 
For Weiler, the critical fact in the relationships among owners 
of sports teams and also of the owners' relationships with fans, is 
that "every major league is a monopoly in its own sport."l03 This 
monopolistic quality is a major reason why the value of sports 
99. Id. at 117 (stating that, as the existing contracts of his players expired, and the 
possibility that they would ask for higher salaries increased, Huizenga traded away 
players for young, inexpensive prospects). 
100. Id. at 218. Weiler concludes that a star hitting .325, even with more home 
runs and runs batted in, instead of .'275, does not warrant a salary twenty times higher 
than his more ordinary teammate. Id. at 214 . 
. 101. Id. at 146-49. 
102. It seems logical to find a causal link between free agency and competitive 
imbalance in professional sports. The New York Yankees, with baseball's highest pay­
roll, have won three of the last four World Series. Weiler believes that competitive 
imbalance has been a particular problem in professional basketball. But what about the 
Seattle Mariners of 2001? Having been forced to trade three major stars-Randy John­
son, Ken Griffey, Jr., and Alex Rodriguez-because of their impending free agency, the 
Mariners have nevertheless emerged from the ashes to become the team with the most 
wins in the major leagues this year. They fell one game short of setting an all-time 
record for wins by a team in one season. Weiler believes that the competitive imbal­
ance is greater in the National Basketball Association than in Major League Baseball. 
Id. at 192. Since the rise of free agency, more teams have won National Basketball 
Association championships than in the preceding era, which had been dominated by the 
Boston Celtics. Id. Because of salary cap restraints, movement by free agents is less 
frequent in basketball than in baseball. Id. at 193. Yet for the 1995-1999 seasons the 
winning percentage of the top three basketball teams was 400% better than that of the 
bottom three teams. Id. at 192. 
103. Id. at 335. 
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franchises has risen for the past several decades.104 This quality 
also impacts almost every interaction between sports franchises and 
fans.105 This section will focus on the one effect that Weiler be­
lieves represents the greatest threat that professional sports poses 
to American society-the monopoly of sports franchises. 106 To at­
tract or retain sports franchises, which are in short supply, many 
cities have been willing to fund the construction of expensive new 
stadiums.107 It is taxpayers, then, who often pay for facilities that 
generate large profits for professional sports teams, consequently 
enhancing the value of these teams.108 Weiler concludes that sta­
dium subsidies are "the biggest social problem we have encoun­
tered in this book."!09 
Sports law has developed in a way that maximizes the pressure 
that teams can exert upon cities to get public funding for their stadi­
ums. Based upon the cases that allowed the Oakland Raiders to 
move to Los Angeles, despite opposition by the National Football 
League, professional leagues are now reluctant to try to restrain 
franchise moves.1!0 Further, the only court to face the issue of 
whether it is a violation of antitrust law for a league to deny an 
application for a new franchise held that it was not.111 The law, 
therefore, allows a team to threaten a city with leaving without giv­
ing the city a viable option of forming its own new team, or the 
option of getting an expansion team to replace the departing one.112 
By the 1990s, the cumulative effect of this law was to foster what 
Weiler calls "franchise free agency."113 The choice that this law ef­
fectively presents to cities is a "Prisoner's Dilemma"-provide huge 
public financing for a new stadium or lose your professional sports 
team.114 
104. [d. 
105. See id. at 336. 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 337. 
108. [d. 
109. [d.; see also id. at 240-41 (listing the costs of new sports stadiums over a 
number of decades). 
110. [d. at 246-5l. 
111. Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 
1983). The plaintiff-team was located in Nashville, Tennessee, which at that time was 
nearly 300 miles away from any other NFL team. [d. at 776. The court specifically 
noted that had the plaintiff been operating within the territory of an existing National 
Football League team, the court might have altered its decision. [d. at 787. 
112. WEILER, supra note 1, at 317. 
113. [d. at 224. See generally id. at 223-45 (describing "franchise free agency"). 
114. Teams have the most leverage against small-market cities, but even large­
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Some cities do refuse to finance new stadiums; for example, 
San Francisco refused to finance a new baseball stadium for the 
Giants. l15 An example such as this one proves that there are pri­
vate sources of funding for sports stadiums.l16 This example, how­
ever, represents a small minority. Since sports are so central a 
feature of popular culture, popular sentiment is not galvanized 
against the public funding of stadiums. To the contrary, there was 
great public angst when, for example, the Raiders moved from 
Oakland,l17 and more recently, when the Browns left Cleveland to 
become the Baltimore Ravens.us 
In contrast to popular sentiment, Weiler presents an encom­
passing critique of public funding for sports stadiums.l19 He begins 
by summarizing the proponents' often used "spin-off benefits" ar­
gument for public financing of stadiums and then points out the 
misconceptions, showing that the "spin-off benefits" argument is 
"dead wrong."120 Weiler concludes that building a stadium is more 
like opening a public park than financing a new industry, and unlike 
a park, patrons must pay to enjoy sports.121 
While a sports team may constitute a big part of a community's 
social life, it constitutes only a small part of the community's econ­
omy.122 Sports franchises are really small businesses.123 They do 
not attract many tourists, and they do not stimulate much new 
spending, . by either residents or tourists, that is beneficial to the 
community at large.124 It is the wealthy who derive most of the 
benefits of new stadiums, given that only wealthy patrons can buy 
market cities are not immune from losing sports franchises. Presently, the huge Los 
Angeles market is without a football team. 
115. Id. at 262. 
116. Id. at 242-43. Major sources of private funding for stadiums include selling 
the stadium's name and selling private seat licenses. Stadium revenues, which include 
parking and refreshments, are another way to finance stadiums. Id. Weiler concludes 
that "more than enough private money is now available to build any needed profes­
sional sports facility." Id. at 338. 
117. Id. at 177. The City of Oakland actually tried to retain the Raiders by taking 
them over through an action of eminent domain. This approach was initially upheld in 
a lower state court, but at a rehearing of the case after remand from the California 
Supreme Court, the court accepted a dormant commerce violation defense against the 
exercise of eminent domain dreamed up by the Raiders' legal team. Id. at 250-51. 
118. Id. at 224-29. 
119. Id. at 265-72. 
120. Id. at 267-69. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 268.. 
124. Id. at 268-69. 
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the luxury boxes.125 Moreover, the money spent upon sports 
mostly increases the profits of team owners and players.126 
Further, if public money pays for a new stadium, the money 
almost always derives from a regressive tax-typically a sales tax.127 
Indeed, everyone, even those in a city that loses a professional 
franchise, helps to finance the deals that allow professional teams to 
relocate.128 Finally, since the costs of building new sports stadiums 
skyrocketed during the 1990's, more and more public money is be­
ing diverted away from other useful purposes, such as education.129 
Weiler's indictment of public financing of stadiums leaves sev­
eral important questions unanswered. First, is it the case that sports 
teams confer only small economic advantages to their cities? Next, 
what effect would a public vote to accept a stadium proposal have 
on Weiler's analysis? Put differently, does popular sovereignty 
trump all other considerations? Weiler's response to these ques­
tions would likely be that popular voting patterns reflect the "Pris­
oner's Dilemma" that law has created for urban sports fans. 
If one accepts Weiler's view that the public financing of stadi­
ums constitutes a major social problem, the next step is to ask what 
should be done about it. One approach might be to apply a dose of 
antitrust law to reduce the monopolistic structure of professional 
sports. There are several ways this could be affected. For example, 
one approach would be to break up the present leagues into three 
or four smaller competitive leagues.13o Another approach would be 
to require leagues to expand into all urban markets that meet cer­
tain objective criteria suggesting that they can reasonably support 
its teams.131 Because of the limitations of antitrust law, courts are 
not likely to mandate such changes.132 Congress, however, clearly 
125. [d. at 271. 
126. Id. at 266, 271. 
127. Id. at 271. There are a number of variations on funding. Sometimes the 
sales tax is targeted to a specific activity; for example, on the purchase of cigarettes and 
alcohol (a "sin tax"); or on the use of hotels and car rentals (a "visitors' tax"); or on 
bars and restaurants (a "fun tax"). Id. at 245. . 
128. Id. at 263-64. Tax-exempt bonds are often used to finance the public funds 
used for these deals, and these require higher rates of federal taxation upon other 
sources of wealth. /d. at 264. 
129. [d. at 240-44 (providing examples of the amounts of money spent on stadi­
ums during the twentieth century). 
130. [d. at 315. 
131. Id. 
132. Since section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only combinations in restraint 
of trade, it implies that the parties involved are separate entities. But there is much 
support for the view that the teams in a professional sports league constitute a single 
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has the authority to mandate these changes if it had the politiCal 
will to do SO.133 Though creating competing professional leagues 
would have numerous advantages for fans, Weiler does not push 
such proposals because he believes that professional sports consti­
tute natural monopoliesP4 No matter how the law structures pro­
fessional sports, over time the gravitational forces of competition 
will tend toward monopolization.135 
Weiler also resists proposals to restrict the movement of sports 
franchises. He points out that the movement of franchises has often 
had a salutary effect for the public.136 Further, he expresses con­
cern over restricting the autonomy of teams and leagues in making 
decisions with respect to franchise movement.137 
These points lead Weiler to focus upon "more moderate and 
feasible legal reforms,"138 and specifically restricting public financ­
ing of stadiumsP9 He advocates a cap on the amount of permissi­
ble public financing of sports stadiums.140 Limiting public funding 
of stadiums could be achieved either by the league self-regulation, 
or by state or federal law.141 Since the former is unlikely, Weiler 
recognizes legal regulation as the best chance for reform.142 There 
are numerous ways to set a cap, including the imposition of a "user­
tax," the formation of a union of municipalities as a single national 
body that would collectively bargain on a cap, or legislation (prefer­
ably federal) that would establish a cap.143 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Some readers may feel tbat even Weiler's moderate proposal 
entity. Section 2 of the Act requires not just monopolies, but improper action. There 
exists far too much legal precedent justifying the methods of doing business of profes­
sional sports teams and leagues for courts to find a section 2 violation at this late date. 
Id. at 298; see also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1, 2 (1890). 
133. WEILER, supra note 1, at 328-29 (detailing how Congress restructured the 
telecommunications industry by breaking up AT&T in the 1980's). 
134. Id. at 330-33. 
135. Id. 
136. For example, professional sports began in the northeast quadrant of the 
United States. Beginning with the movement of the Dodgers and baseball Giants from 
New York to California during the 1950's, professional sports has now spread to all 
parts of the United States. Id. at 260-62. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 333. 
139. Id. at 345. 
140. Id. at 272-77. 
141. Id. at 274-75. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 272-77. 
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for the regulation of stadium financing imposes the law of state in­
stitutions to too great an extent upon contemporary sports. This 
important issue will be worked through in cities across America in 
the upcoming decades of the new century. Reasonable readers may 
disagree not only about how to resolve the issue of the financing of 
stadiums, but also about other sticky issues raised by Weiler 
throughout the book. Still, one cannot deny that Weiler has, in 
Leveling the Playing Field, established his basic premise. Although 
the marriage of law and the contemporary professional sports in­
dustry may not have been forged in heaven, it seems that it is a 
marriage that must endure if sports are to thrive and to avoid fur­
ther alienating popular culture during the twenty-first century. 
